Too much and too fast? Public investment scaling-up and absorptive capacity  by Presbitero, Andrea F.
Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 17–31
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Development Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /devecToo much and too fast? Public investment scaling-up and
absorptive capacity☆Andrea F. Presbitero
International Monetary Fund, United States
Universita' Politecnical della Marche and MoFiR, Italy☆ This research is part of a project on Macroecono
Countries (project id: 60925) supported by the U.K.'s
Development. This paper should not be reported as repre
of DFID. The views expressed in this paper are tho
necessarily represent those of the IMF, IMF policy, or of
Berg, Jurgen Blum, Patrick Francois (the editor), Christ
Papageorgiou, Catherine Pattillo, Andrew Warner, Felip
referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am
for sharing the latest version of the data on the IEG Wo
Ratings. The usual disclaimers apply.
E-mail address: apresbitero@imf.org
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.12.005
0304-3878/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.Va b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 4 April 2015
Received in revised form 21 November 2015
Accepted 28 December 2015
Available online 6 January 2016A recent trend in several low-income developing countries has been a rapid scaling-up of public investment. It is
argued that in the presence of limited absorptive capacity countries are not able – in terms of skills, institutions,
and management – to translate additional public investment into sustained output growth. We test for the
presence of absorptive capacity constraints using a large dataset of World Bank investment projects, approved
between 1970 and 2007 in 80 countries. Our results indicate that projects undertaken in periods of public invest-
ment scaling-up are less likely to be successful, although this effect is relatively small, especially in poor and
capital scarce countries. We also verify that this effect is unrelated to large aid ﬂows and donor fragmentation.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
Public investment
Absorptive capacity
Investment projects
Donor fragmentation
Infrastructure1. Introduction
Several low-income developing countries (LIDCs) have recently
increased public investment, mainly driven by the need to ﬁll their in-
frastructure and development gaps and to foster economic growth.
Since 2007, public capital spending in LIDCs accounted for more than
ﬁve percent of GDP and, in some countries, it increased substantially
and is now above 10% of GDP. This sharp increase has been associated
with the scaling-up of infrastructure investment, sometimes related to
the exploitation of natural resources or reconstruction spending in the
aftermath of natural disasters and conﬂicts. The studies on the relation-
ship between public investment and output growth go back to the big
push theory of development economics. Notwithstanding a few notable
dissenting views (Easterly 2001), the idea that a scaling-up of publicmic Research in Low-Income
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rld Bank Project Performance
. This is an open access article underinvestment could foster development is generally taken for granted by
policymakers and is reﬂected in many policy recommendations. For
instance, the inﬂuential Growth Report lists public investment as
one of the most important policy ingredients of growth strategies,
because “public investment […] helps the economy to accumulate
the infrastructure and skills it needs to grow quickly” (Commission
on Growth and Development, 2008, p.34).
However, the empirical literature does not provide a consistent body
of evidence supporting a positive association between the scaling-up of
public investment and economic growth. In a seminal paper, Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) show that public investment is positively correlated
with output growth across countries; on the other hand, Devarajan et al.
(1996) ﬁnd that in developing countries, public capital expenditures are
negatively associatedwith economic growth.More recently, Abiad et al.
(2015) use forecast errors to identify government investment shocks
and ﬁnd evidence of a positive effect of public investment on output
in advanced economies. Eden and Kraay (2014) focus on a sample of
39 low-income countries and exploit the relevance of long-term dis-
bursements of ofﬁcial creditor loans to isolate a predetermined source
of variation in government investment (Kraay 2012). Their estimates
point to a signiﬁcant and positive output effect.
By contrast,when looking at large public investment boomepisodes,
Warner (2014) ﬁnds ‘very little’ evidence supporting the idea that pub-
lic capital can promote growth.
One of the reasons that may explain the weak association be-
tween public investment accelerations and output growth is limitedthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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way to conceptualize absorptive capacity is in terms of declining
marginal returns to public investment. In that sense, one could
think that the output gains of additional public investment diminish
as long as public capital is accumulated, so that the expected rate of
return is declining with capital investment (Adler 1965). Declining
marginal returns could be due to constraints in the availability of in-
stitutional, human, and infrastructure capital.2 However, as long as
those factors can be adjusted, the conventional hypothesis of
diminishing returns to public capital with other factors held constant
is weakened.
A slightly different way to think about absorptive capacity is to
relate supply bottlenecks with public investment dynamics. It has
been argued that when the pace of investment (rather than the
level) is above a certain threshold, countries do not have the capacity
– in terms of skills, institutions, and management – to reap the ben-
eﬁt of additional public investment, as the implementation of several
investment projects would require a varied set of technical andman-
agerial resources which cannot be expanded in the short-run. In the
words of (Adler 1965),“absorptive capacity may […] be deﬁned as
that amount of investment, or that rate of gross domestic investment
expressed as a proportion of GNP, that can be made at an acceptable
rate of return, with the supply of co-operant factors considered as
given.” This interpretation still embeds the notion of declining mar-
ginal returns, but stresses the role that binding supply bottlenecks
can have on rates of return of public investment in the short-run.
This idea reﬂects the limit on the ability to invest (‘skill limit’) em-
bedded in the two-gap model of foreign aid (Chenery and Strout
1966). Moreover, when the pace of public investment acceleration
is sustained for a signiﬁcant period, government ofﬁcials may not
have the capacity to select projects with high expected rates of re-
turn, so ﬁnancing poor projects can lead to a reduction in the average
return of public investment. Consistent with this line of argument,
Shi (2013) ﬁnds a limit to the growth effect of infrastructure invest-
ment, which is associated with rising input costs.
For the purpose of this analysis, we limit the deﬁnition of absorp-
tive capacity to the dynamic context, meaning that we focus on the
consequences of rapid acceleration of public investment.3 It is
worth noting that the concept of absorptive capacity is also different
from that of public investment efﬁciency, whichmeasures the capac-
ity to transform each dollar spent into actual public capital, irrespec-
tive of the amount and pace of public investment. The two concepts,
however, are closely related and one could argue that when public
investment is constrained by absorptive capacity, efﬁciency falls,
given that project costs increase and the share of investment that
translates into public capital declines.41 Berg and Berg (1983) provide an extensive reviewof the early literature on absorptive
capacity, while the International Monetary Fund (2012) presents an overview of the con-
cept of absorptive capacity.
2 In addition, public investment above a certain threshold could create distortions in the
private sector and the resulting crowding-out of private investment could have an adverse
effect on GDP growth (Kelly 1997; Fosu et al. 2012).
3 In the literature, absorptive capacity is also deﬁned in a static framework in which a
country is unable to absorb public investment tout court, irrespective of the level and the
pace of the scaling-up of investment. In other words, absorptive capacity is not necessarily
related to the presence of supply bottlenecks but, more simply, it may depend on the lack
of adequate institutional and economic resources required to plan and implement invest-
ment projects.Within this framework, Becker et al. (2013) look at transferswithin regions
in the European Union and measure absorptive capacity by human capital endowments
and the quality of regional government. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design, they
ﬁnd evidence that absorptive capacity matters, as sufﬁciently high levels of education and
institutional quality in the recipient regions are necessary for European regional redistri-
bution programs to translate into investment and GDP growth. Given that we are interest-
ed in the effect of large scaling-up of public investment, we do not consider this deﬁnition
of absorptive capacity. However, the empirical analysis will take into account educational
and institutional quality as factors that may affect the rate of success of public investment.
4 For a discussion of investment efﬁciency and its measurement, see Berg et al. (2015)
and (International Monetary Fund (2015).Consistent with the interpretation of absorptive capacity in terms
of rapid acceleration of public investment, recent models highlight
the key role of absorptive capacity constraints in determining the
output effect of large public investment scaling-up episodes (Berg
et al. 2013; Richmond et al. 2015; van der Ploeg 2012).5
Notwithstanding the importance of absorptive capacity for quan-
tifying the growth dividend of public investment, empirical evidence
on absorptive capacity constraints in developing countries is rela-
tively limited. The main contribution of this paper is to shed some
light on this issue by testing for the presence of absorptive capacity
constraints in developing countries. We use a large dataset of
World Bank projects approved between 1970 and 2007 in more
than 100 countries, and we merge micro project-level data with
macro country-level variables to test whether investment project
outcomes worsen when public investment accelerates compared to
historical patterns.
An alternative explanation for the presence of a negative association
between investment scaling-up and project outcomes could be related
to large aid inﬂows. The aid literature generally models the notion
that the capacity to absorb foreign aid is impaired by various types of
bottlenecks as a non-linearity, implying that there are diminishing
returns to aid (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2006; Clemens et al. 2012)
or its effect is conditional on the quality of policies and institutions in
recipient countries (see Rajan and Subramanian 2008, for an exten-
sive review). Other than the level of aid, donor proliferation could
also weaken aid effectiveness, as multiple donors could create coor-
dination problems, raise overall costs (e.g. because of transaction
costs, unexploited returns to scale, and donor-speciﬁc procedures),
foster corruption (e.g. increasing the negotiating power of recipient
governments), and reduce the quality of the public sector bureaucra-
cy (e.g. as interaction with donors are costly in terms of staff time
and donors “poach” themost talented and qualiﬁed local employees)
(Djankov et al. 2009; Knack and Rahman 2007; Svensson 2008). Con-
sistent with these arguments, it has been shown that donor fragmen-
tation is correlated with lower levels of bureaucratic quality in
recipient countries (Knack and Rahman 2007) and weakens the
effect of aid on economic growth (Djankov et al. 2009).6 Therefore,
in the empirical analysis we also control for the level of foreign aid
and for a measure of donor fragmentation, to differentiate between
a ‘pure’ absorptive capacity constraint, due to investment accelera-
tion, from a more general effect due to donor fragmentation and
aid bonanza.
Our empirical approach builds on a strand of literature that in-
vestigates the potential determinants of World Bank project out-
comes, measuring the extent to which cross-country differences
in institutional quality, macroeconomic policies, and macroeco-
nomic performance can explain the variability of project outcomes
(Blum 2014; Bulman et al. 2015; Chauvet et al. 2010; Dollar and
Levin 2005; Guillaumont and Laajaj 2006; Kilby 2000; Kilby 2015;
Limodio 2011; The World Bank 2010). In two seminal contribu-
tions, Isham et al. (1997) and Isham and Kaufmann (1999) ﬁnd a5 Speciﬁcally, van der Ploeg (2012) models the presence of absorptive capacity con-
straints in terms of increasing internal costs of adjustment of public investment that occur
when public investment is ramped up. Differently, Berg et al. (2013) calibrate a dynamic
stochastic model to analyze the macroeconomic effects of investing resource revenues,
modeling absorptive capacity constraints in terms of the relationship between public cap-
ital produced (i.e. effective investment) and actual investment expenditures. In the aid
context, Carter (2014) introduces absorptive capacity constraints in a standard neoclassi-
cal growth model to show that the optimal aid allocation rule (which maximizes con-
sumption in recipient countries) depends on the level of absorptive capacity in the
recipient country, which is a function of aid intensity.
6 In this vein, Feeny and Silva (2012) develop a speciﬁc index of absorptive capacity,
which builds on three main blocks: physical and human capital, governance quality and
donor practices. They employ this index of absorptive capacity in a standard growth re-
gression to assess the impact of aid on GDP growth and ﬁnd some evidence supporting
the hypothesis that the positive effect of aid on growth depends of the degree of absorp-
tive capacity of recipient countries.
10 More speciﬁcally, projects are evaluated according to this rating scale (see http://ieg.
worldbankgroup.org/ratingshttp://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/ratings):
• Highly Satisfactory: there were no shortcomings in the operation's achievement of its
objectives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
• Satisfactory: therewereminor shortcomings in the operation's achievement of its objec-
tives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
•Moderately Satisfactory: there were moderate shortcomings in the operation's achieve-
ment of its objectives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
• Moderately Unsatisfactory: there were signiﬁcant shortcomings in the operation's
achievement of its objectives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
•Unsatisfactory: thereweremajor shortcomings in the operation's achievement of its ob-
jectives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
• Highly Unsatisfactory: there were severe shortcomings in the operation's achievement
of its objectives, in its efﬁciency, or in its relevance.
In addition to the overall evaluation, the IEG publishes an explicit evaluation of the bor-
rower performancewhich is rated, again on a six-point rating scale, by assessing separate-
ly: (i) the governmentperformance (central and/or local government as relevant), and (ii)
the implementing agency or agencies performance. The ratings of the two separate di-
mensions are combined to produce an overall borrower performance rating. Where the
government and implementing agency are indistinguishable, there is only an overall rat-
ing. For detailed information, see http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/ratingshttp://ieg.
worldbankgroup.org/ratings. Finally, for a subset of projects (less than 4000) the IEG re-
leases the expected rate of return of the project, evaluated at appraisal and at completion.
We do not use expected rate of returns as a measure of project outcome given that, be-
cause of sample size, the limited variability over time and across countries would prevent
a sound identiﬁcation of the correlationwith country-level variables. On the limitations of
19A.F. Presbitero / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 17–31strong positive association between civil liberties, good macroeco-
nomic policies, and the performance of government investment
projects ﬁnanced by the World Bank. Interestingly, Isham and
Kaufmann (1999) also show that the productivity of individual
public investment projects increases with the share of public in-
vestment over GDP in the country, especially where the economic
policy environment is relatively undistorted, but this positive cor-
relation turns negative when the public investment-to-GDP ratio
is larger than 10%. Recently, Denizer et al. (2013) conﬁrm that
the quality of policies and institutions and GDP growth are strong
predictors of projects' success, but they also underscore that a
great part of the variation of project outcomes is within countries
rather than between countries.7
We contribute to the literature by testing for the presence of
absorptive capacity, focusing on the effect of public investment
scaling-up on the performance of investment projects. Our results
lend support to the presence of absorptive capacity constraints.
The estimates indicate that projects undertaken in periods of pub-
lic investment scaling-up are less likely to be successful, although
this effect is small, and the effect is relatively smaller in low-
income and capital scarce countries. This result holds controlling
for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity of project outcomes
within sectors and country ﬁxed effects. We also ﬁnd that project
outcomes depend on the quality of policies and institutions and
on the overall aid ﬂows to a country, while donor fragmentation
is not robustly associated with project outcomes. We explore pos-
sible non-linearities, ﬁnding that the negative correlation be-
tween public investment accelerations and the success of
investment projects is stronger in countries that are richer, have
stronger policies and institutions, and have higher public capital
stock-to-GDP ratio.
The paper proceeds as follow. After presenting the World Bank in-
vestment project dataset and some empirical regularities (Section 2),
we turn to the regression analysis (Section 3), discussion of our results
(Section 4), some robustness tests (Section 5), and our conclusions
(Section 6).
2. World Bank projects data
2.1. Data
To address ourmain research question, we test for the presence of
absorptive capacity constraints by looking at the correlation be-
tween the outcomes of individual investment projects and the
scaling-up of the public investment-to-GDP ratio during the life of
the project. We use the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) World
Bank Project Performance Ratings (PPR), a large database at the pro-
ject level, with data on more than 10,000 projects ﬁnanced by the
World Bank in 157 countries since 1960.8 To the best of our knowl-
edge, this data set is one of the broadest publicly available source
about public investment outcomes in developing countries.9 Other
than information about the kind of project, its sector, length, and ﬁ-
nancing, a key feature of these data is that they include a measure of
project evaluation, in terms of outcome ratings. Before 1995, projects
were evaluated on a binary satisfactory/unsatisfactory scale on the
grounds of the ‘Implementation Completion Report’ produced by
the team leader and based on a subjective assessment of the degree
to which the project met its targets. Since 1995, this sort of ‘self-as-
sessment’ was subject to an additional layer of validation by the7 This result is also emphasized by Blum (2014), where the best ﬁt model predicts only
19% of the variation in the outcome ratings.
8 We use the November 2013 version of the data set, available on the World Bank
website. In building many project-speciﬁc variables, we follow closely Denizer et al.
(2013).
9 Recent papers use additional data from the Asian Development Bank (Bulman et al.
2015) and from other eight agencies (Honig 2015).IEG, which introduced a six-point rating scale, ranging from highly
satisfactory to highly unsatisfactory, according to the extent to
which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or
are expected to be achieved, efﬁciently; for additional details see
Denizer et al. (2013) and Kilby (2015).10
In our analysis, we consider exclusively investment projects, ex-
cluding development policy lending, which is typically intended for
general budget support to help adjust to economic crises and to pro-
mote macroeconomic and structural reforms.11 We also exclude a
few projects started before 1960 and the ones which refer to regions,
rather than countries, to be able to merge the micro-level data with
the macroeconomic variables. We merge the investment project
data from the World Bank PPR data set approved in the period
1970–2007 with a set of standard macroeconomic variables and
some indicators that should capture limits on absorptive capacity.
In particular, we take data on public investment and capital stocks
from Gupta et al. (2014), who disaggregate total investment as pub-
lished in the PennWorld Table by applying public and private invest-
ment shares from IMFWorld Economic Outlook (WEO) database and
then use the perpetual inventory method for estimating public capi-
tal stocks. The measure of human capital is drawn from the Penn
World Table (version 8.0), while data on real GDP, total aid, World
Bank lending, and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) are taken from the World Development Indicators.12 Finally,
we build the measure of donor fragmentation using data on total
ofﬁcial development assistance published in the International Devel-
opment Statistics database by the OECD.
The list of all variables used in the analysis, their sources, and de-
scriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. In the following, we present
some descriptive evidence about the evolution of project outcomes.
Then, we move to a multivariate regression framework to assess the
correlation between themacroeconomic variables and investment pro-
ject outcomes, taking into account observable and unobservable hetero-
geneity at the project level.the expected rate of returns data, see also Pritchett (2010).
11 As stated on http://digitalmedia.worldbank.org/projectsandops/lendingtools.htmits
website, the World Bank “has two basic types of lending instruments: investment loans
and development policy loans. Investment loans have a long-term focus (5 to 10 years),
and ﬁnance goods, works and services in support of economic and social development
projects in a broad range of sectors. Development policy loans provide quick-disbursing
external ﬁnancing to support a government's policy and institutional reforms”.
12 Data on the CPIA prior to 2005 and for middle-income countries are conﬁdential.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnition, sources and descriptive statistics.
Variable Deﬁnition Source Mean St.
dev.
Min Max Obs.
Project-level variables
OUTCOME Dummy equal to one if the project i undertaken in country j in year t is
evaluated as satisfactory and zero otherwise. See Section 2.1 for details.
IEG WB PPR 0.707 0.455 0 1 3945
SIZE Logarithm of the cost of the project, in constant USD. IEG WB PPR 17.674 1.367 13.816 22.547 3945
SHARE WB FINANCING Share of World Bank ﬁnancing in the total project cost. IEG WB PPR 0.795 0.279 0 1 3,945
SHARE 1st SECTOR Share of the largest share of the project assigned to a single sector. IEG WB PPR 82.595 23.995 10 100 3945
ERR(0/1) Dummy equal to one if the project has received the expected rate of return at
appraisal, and zero otherwise.
IEG WB PPR 0.441 0.497 0 1 3945
REPEATER Dummy equal to one for projects ones which are follow-ups of previous
projects. We code projects as follow-up as they include in the name string
roman numerals.
IEG WB PPR 0.187 0.390 0 1 3945
TIME EVALUATION Number of years between the evaluation and the end ﬁscal years of the
project.
IEG WB PPR 1.771 1.851 0 20 3910
INFRASTRUCTURE (0/1) Dummy equal to one if the project is undertaken, for the largest part, either in
the agriculture, energy and mining, industry and trade, transportation, or
water sectors, and zero otherwise.
IEG WB PPR 0.620 0.485 0 1 3945
SECTOR Categorical variable for the following 10 sectors: agriculture, energy and
mining, industry and trade, transportation, water, education, ﬁnance, health
and other social services, information and communication, and public
administration. Each project is assigned one sector on the basis of the largest
sectoral share.
IEG WB PPR – – – – 3945
LENDING INSTRUMENT Categorical variable for 11 lending instruments. IEG WB PPR – – – – 3945
TYPE EVALUATION Categorical variable for the three type of project evaluations: the standard
Implementation Completion Report (ICR) by theWorld Bank, the desk review
by the IEG, and the more detailed Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR).
IEG WB PPR – – – – 3945
Country-level variables
SCALE UP Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the
average over the previous 5-year period, averaged over the length of the
project. See Section 3.1 and Eq. (2) for details.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014))
data
−0.418 1.623 −14.127 8.751 3945
SCALE UP3 Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the average
over the previous 3-year period, averaged over the length of the project.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
−0.300 1.179 −10.882 6.498 3945
SCALE UP10 Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the
average over the previous 10-year period, averaged over the length of the
project.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
−0.595 2.400 −18.473 16.508 3945
SCALE UPay
3 Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the
average over the previous 3-year period, in the year of project approval.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
−0.217 2.560 −15.894 19.628 3600
SCALE UPay
5 Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the
average over the previous 5-year period, in the year of project approval.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
−0.265 2.906 −15.619 19.141 3600
SCALE UPay
10 Difference between the actual public investment-to-GDP ratio and the
average over the previous 10-year period, in the year of project approval.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
−0.323 3.564 −25.567 23.751 3600
BOOM Dummy equal to one if there is at least an investment boom (booms are
deﬁned as events when the public investment-to-GDP ratio is above a
threshold (10%) and the deviation from its historical trend is above one
standard deviation of the detrended investment-to-GDP series) during the
length of the project.
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
0.356 0.479 0 1 3945
BOOMay Dummy equal to one if the starting year of the project is also an investment
boom year (booms are deﬁned as events when the public investment-to-GDP
ratio is above a threshold (10%) and the deviation from its historical trend is
above one standard deviation of the detrended investment-to-GDP series).
Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
0.057 0.231 0 1 3945
GROWTH Real GDP per capita growth (annual %), in the starting year of the project. WDI 2.464 4.548 −47.314 20.722 3945
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings, in the starting year of the
project.
World Bank 3.653 0.677 1 6 3945
GDP Logarithm of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD), in the starting year of
the project.
WDI 6.909 1.048 4.963 9.719 3945
HC Average years of schooling. See Feenstra et al. (2013) for additional details.
The measure is averaged over the length of the project.
PWT 8.0 1.966 0.466 1.088 3.146 3945
AID Total net ofﬁcial development assistance (% GNI), averaged over the length of
the project.
WDI 5.431 7.186 −0.072 50.512 3945
AIDay Total net ofﬁcial development assistance (% GNI), in the starting year of the
project.
WDI 5.789 8.310 −0.475 94.946 3923
FRAGMENTATION 1− Herﬁndahl index calculated on the share of gross disbursements of total
ODA by individual donors, averaged over the length of the project.
OECD DAC (Table 2a) 0.803 0.097 0.243 0.931 3945
FRAGMENTATIONay 1− Herﬁndahl index calculated on the share of gross disbursements of total
ODA by individual donors, in the starting year of the project.
OECD DAC (Table 2a) 0.806 0.105 0.191 0.941 3931
SHARE TOP3 DONORS Share of gross disbursements of total ODA by the top 3 individual donors,
averaged over the length of the project.
OECD DAC (Table 2a) 61.275 11.974 32.447 94.367 3945
G/Y Public capital stock over GDP, in the year of project approval. Gupta et al. (2014) 0.852 0.647 0.088 5.942 3945
ΔG/Y Change in the public capital stock-to-GDP ratio over the length of the project. Author's calculation on
Gupta et al. (2014) data
0.031 0.241 −0.547 2.581 3382
WB LENDING IBRD loans and IDA credits over GDP, averaged over the length of the project. WDI 0.106 0.119 0.000 0.923 3830
RESOURCE RENT Value of total natural resources rents over GDP, averaged over the length of
the project.
WDI 7.307 7.272 0.003 66.713 3923
Notes: IEG WB PPR: IEG World Bank Project Performance Ratings; WDI: World Development Indicators; and PWT 8.0: Penn World Tables, version 8.0.
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At ﬁrst, we analyze the pattern of individual investment projects,
separating successful from unsuccessful ones. To do so, we follow
Denizer et al. (2013), Kilby (2015) and Bulman et al. (2015) and we
do not exploit the granular distinction in the six-grade classiﬁcation.
Rather, we classify projects evaluated as “highly satisfactory,” “satisfac-
tory,” and “moderately satisfactory” as successful projects; projects
evaluated as “highly unsatisfactory,” “unsatisfactory,” and “moderately
unsatisfactory” are coded as unsuccessful projects. We label the
resulting dummy variable as OUTCOME.13
There are 7843 projects approved between 1970 and 2007, 6980 of
which are investment loans. After adding a standard set of project-
level variables and dropping observations with missing values, we are
left with 6750 investment project loans approved in 150 countries.
This sample excludes recent years as there are a limited number of
approved projects per year that have already been evaluated by end-
2013. Fig. 1 plots, for each approval year, the number of projects (and
the corresponding countries in which they were undertaken) and the
average share of successful projects. The number of projects included
in the data set increased signiﬁcantly in the 1970 and stabilized around
200 projects per year in the following two decades. Since 2000,though,
the number of approved projects per year included in the data set de-
creased, given that an increasing number of them have not yet been
evaluated. The number of countries covered per year is quite stable
around 65 to 80 countries.
The share of successful projects ﬂuctuates around 70%: this share
decreased substantially in the 1970s and was about 65% in the 1980s,
and then increased to 74% in the remaining years. Fig. 2 shows the
distribution across countries of the average share of satisfactory projects
approved between 1970 and 2007. The map clearly points out the rela-
tively poorer performance in many sub-Saharan African countries com-
pared to more successful countries in Eastern Europe and Asia.
3. The empirical setup
To inspect the relationship between macroeconomic conditions –
and public capital accumulation in particular – and investment project
outcomes, we turn to a standard multivariate regression framework.
We focus the analysis on speciﬁc investment loans, excluding develop-
ment policy loans. After merging the project data with country-speciﬁc
variables, we are left with a sample of 3972 investment projects ap-
proved between 1977 and 2007 — and evaluated between 1980 and
2013 — in 80 countries (see Table A1), 3945 of which are actually
used in the empirical models (27 observations are dropped as single-
tons, meaning that 27 ﬁxed effects used in the analysis – see Eq. (1)
below – contain only one observation). The average value of the depen-
dent variable in this sample is 0.71 (s.d. = 0.46), almost identical to the
average value in the larger sample of 6750 investment projects (0.71,
s.d. = 0.45), and the distribution of projects by sectors is also very sim-
ilar in the two samples (Table A2), suggesting that there is not a signif-
icant sample selection bias when restricting the sample to the projects
for which we can merge macroeconomic variables.
On this sample of 3945 investment projects, we estimate a simple
linear probability model in which the dependent variable is the IEG cat-
egorical evaluation of project outcomes, re-coded as the binary variable:
OUTCOMEijt ¼ βCOUNTRYjt þ γγPROJECTijt þ ϵijt ð1Þ13 Blum (2014) suggests that a meaningful threshold in the data is between “satisfacto-
ry” and “moderately satisfactory” projects, rather than between “moderately satisfactory”
and “moderately unsatisfactory.” This threshold effect may be due to the fact that a “satis-
factory” assessment could be quite accurate, while a “moderately satisfactory” could be a
merciful evaluation of projects that actually deserve an unsatisfactory assessment. Howev-
er, given that we want to cover a long time span and the six-grade scale was introduced
only in 1994, we use the standard satisfactory versus unsatisfactory classiﬁcation which
is consistent throughout the whole sample period.where OUTCOMEijt is a dummy equal to one if the investment project i
undertaken in country j in year t is evaluated as satisfactory and zero
otherwise. The project outcome is a function of a set of country-
speciﬁc variables (COUNTRYjt) and of a vector of project-speciﬁc charac-
teristics (PROJECTijt), while ϵijt is the error term.We cluster the standard
errors at the country year-of-evaluation level to allow for the potential
correlation of the residuals within these groups (Denizer et al. 2013).14
We take into account unobservable project-speciﬁc and time-varying
heterogeneity by saturating Eq. (1) with a set of sector × approval year
and sector × evaluation year dummies, which would control for exter-
nal (sector speciﬁc) aggregate shocks and unobservable changes in
the evaluation standards over time. As the number of projects in some
countries is relatively small, we do not include country ﬁxed effects
jointly with macroeconomic variables in our baseline estimates, to
allow for better identiﬁcation of the country-speciﬁc variables. Howev-
er, in Section 5 we show that results are robust to the inclusion of coun-
try ﬁxed effects and can also be interpreted in the within-country
dimension. The list, deﬁnitions and summary statistics of all variables
are reported in Table 1.
3.1. Country-speciﬁc variables
To take into account the role of absorptive capacity constraints on
the outcome of investment projects, we introduce a variable capturing
thepace of public investment scaling-up (SCALEUP). Thismeasure is ob-
tained by calculating, for each year t, the difference between the actual
public investment-to-GDP ratio of country j and its average over the
previous ﬁve-year period. Then, we take the average of this difference
over the length of the project. The intuition is that a sharp deviation of
public investment from the historical average could signal potential ab-
sorptive capacity bottlenecks. More formally, we calculate the measure
of scaling-up as:
SCALE UPjt ¼
1
ey−ay
Xey
t¼ay
Public investment
GDP
 
t
−
1
5
Xay−1
t¼ay−5
Public investment
GDP
 
t
 !" #
ð2Þ
where ay and ey are, respectively, the year of the approval and end year
of the project.15
The set of country-level controls includes other variables that could
affect investment outcomes. First, we need to assesswhether absorptive
capacity constraints are related to overall public investment or to aid-
driven investment. To take into account the possible confounding effect
of foreign aid, we include two variables: 1) the ratio of total ofﬁcial
development assistance (ODA) over GNI, and 2) a measure of donor
fragmentation. The former controls for the possibility that supply
bottlenecks could also bind during periods of large foreign capital in-
ﬂows, given that countries may not have enough resources to manage
public investment projects. The latter builds on the literature on donor
fragmentation, according to which coordination failures, costly interac-
tions with donors, andworsening bureaucratic quality could reduce the
success of investment projects. While there is no clear consensus in the
empirical literature on how to measure donor fragmentation, in our
baseline analysis we follow Easterly (2007) and Djankov et al. (2009),
and we construct the following index of donor fragmentation as one
minus the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index for shares of donors' ODA in14 We also follow Denizer et al. (2013) in estimating a simple linear probability model;
this has the advantage of immediately showing the proportion of the variance of the de-
pendent variable explained by project- and country-speciﬁc factors. Coefﬁcients can also
be easily interpreted as marginal effects, especially for the interaction terms. For robust-
ness we also report the probit estimates, which are consistent with the ﬁndings discussed
throughout the paper (see Tables A4–A6 in the Appendix).
15 In the robustness test, we experimentwith a number of alternativemeasures of public
investment scaling-up.
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Fig. 1. Investment project data, by approval year. Note: Elaborations based on the IEG World Bank Project Performance Ratings data set (on a sample of 6750 investment projects).
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FRAGMENTATIONjt ¼ 1−
XN
d¼1
ODAdjtXN
d¼1ODAdjt
0
@
1
A
2
ð3Þ
where ODAdjt is gross disbursements of ODA by donor d to country j at
time t. This variable is then averaged over the length of the project.
The sum of the squared aid shares measures the probability that two
randomly drawn aid dollars come from the same donor, while a higher
value of the index indicates a higher degree of donor fragmenta-
tion. Then, as a robustness we also use the share of total ODA pro-
vided by the three largest donors as an alternative measure of donor
concentration.16
We take into account the possibility that project outcomes are af-
fected by the lack of adequate institutional and economic skills and
by poor macroeconomic policies, irrespective of the level and the
pace of public investment, including the overall Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score in the starting year of the pro-
ject. This index is compiled by theWorld Bank and is widely used as a
proxy of countries' policies and institutions.
Finally, we control for differences in the level of economic and
social development and in the macroeconomic performance across
countries adding the logarithm of real per capita GDP (GDP), an in-
dicator of human capital (HC, which measures the average years of
schooling, as calculated in the Penn World Tables on the basis of
the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset), and the growth rate of real
per capita GDP (GROWTH). Growth and GDP per capita are mea-
sured in the starting year of the project to mitigate endogeneity
concerns (Kilby 2015).1716 In building themeasures of donor fragmentation we consider all donors, bilateral and
multilateral. Considering exclusively Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor
countries does not affect our main ﬁndings (results are available on request).
17 Our ﬁndings do not change measuring those variables as averages over the length of
the project, as in Denizer et al. (2013); results are available on request.3.2. Project-speciﬁc variables
The set of project-level variables includes a number of indicators
that control for different projects characteristics. A ﬁrst dimension
which is likely to affect project outcomes is the degree of complex-
ity. While complexity is difﬁcult to measure precisely, we follow
Denizer et al. (2013) and we try to capture complexity using three
variables. We use the size of the project, measured by the logarithm
of the USD cost of the project (SIZE), under the assumption that
larger project are more complex to undertake. Then, we exploit
the information about the sectoral classiﬁcation and we take the
share of the largest share of the project assigned to a single sector
(SHARE 1st SECTOR) as a measure of low complexity, on the ground
that projects that span across a number of different sectors are more
complex to manage. Finally, we create a binary indicator that identiﬁes
‘repeated’projects as the oneswhich are follow-ups of previous projects
(REPEATED), assuming that these projects will be less complex than
brand new ones.
We have information on World Bank involvement in the overall
project, which could be measured by the share of the project cost
which has been ﬁnanced by the World Bank (SHARE WB FINANCING)
and we can also identify projects for which there has been an assess-
ment of the expected rate of return, as they may systematically differ
from other projects (ERR).
We also exploit the information about sectors and lending in-
struments. As the data set assigns a percentage of each project to
up to ﬁve different sectors, we classify the projects on the basis of
the largest sectoral assignment into 10 sectors: agriculture, energy
and mining, industry and trade, transportation, water, education, ﬁ-
nance, health and other social services, information and communi-
cation, and public administration. This classiﬁcation allow us also
to restrict projects to the ones which are targeted to infrastructure
investment, considering only projects in the following ﬁve sectors:
agriculture, energy and mining, industry and trade, transportation,
and water.18 Because investment loans are disbursed through six18 This classiﬁcation of infrastructure projects is admittedly rough but the best available
in the data set.
Quintiles
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Fig. 2. Investment project successful rates, by country. Notes: elaborations based on the IEGWorld Bank Project Performance Ratings data set (on a sample of 6750 investment projects).
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count unobservable differences across lending instruments. Other
project-speciﬁc variables related to project length and evaluation are
not included as they are potentially endogenous to the likelihood of
project success. However, results do not change after including them
(see Section 5).
4. Results
4.1. Main ﬁndings
The baseline regression results of the OLS estimation of Eq. (1) are
reported in Table 2. Each speciﬁcation controls for lending instrument,
sector × approval year, and sector × evaluation year ﬁxed effects. In
the ﬁrst column we estimate Eq. (1) on the whole sample of World
Bank investment projects andwe just include project-speciﬁc variables,
to have a ﬁrst assessment of their correlationwith project outcomes and
of the explanatory power of the model. In the second column, we aug-
ment the ﬁrst speciﬁcation by adding country ﬁxed-effects to evaluate
the relative contribution that country-speciﬁc characteristics can bring
to the model.
The ﬁrst regression shows that the model is able to explain about
18% of the variation in project outcomes. Adding country ﬁxed effects
increases the R2 of the model to 25.3% (column 2). This result, while
consistent with the ﬁnding that a large part of the variation in project
outcomes still happens within countries across projects (Bulman et al.
2015; Denizer et al. 2013), indicates that country-speciﬁc characteristics
signiﬁcantly contribute to the predictive power of themodel (in relative
terms, macroeconomic factors can account for one-fourth of the vari-
ance explained by the model).
4.1.1. Country-level variables
Given that we are interested in the effect of country-level variables
on the likelihood that a project is successful, in column 3 we estimate
our preferred speciﬁcation of Eq. (1), adding the set of country-
speciﬁc variables (COUNTRYjt) and dropping country ﬁxed effects. Re-
sults indicate that the set of macro controls is indeed able to capture
about 20% of the variability in the outcome variable, which is due to
country-speciﬁc effects. The baseline speciﬁcation (column 3) isestimated over the whole sample of investment projects, while in the
remaining columns we estimate the model on different sub-samples,
considering only infrastructure projects (column 4) and the ones evalu-
ated after 1995, in order to focus exclusively on projects that have been
reviewed by IEG, either by desk reviews or by a more detailed Project
Performance Audit Report (column 5).
Moving to speciﬁc results, we ﬁnd that the correlation between
the measure of public investment scaling-up and the likelihood
that a project is rated as satisfactory is negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant across all model speciﬁcations. To quantify the economic
magnitude of this correlation, our results indicate that a 3% increase
in the public investment-to-GDP ratio with respect to its average in
the previous ﬁve-year period is associated with a reduction of 3.9
percentage points in the probability of a successful outcome (column
3). This effect is relatively small but stable even when we restrict the
sample to infrastructure projects and to the ones evaluated after
1995.
The coefﬁcients on the aid-to-GNI ratio show that investment pro-
jects are less likely to be successful when aid is particularly large: a
one standard deviation increase in foreign aid is associated with a 3.1
percentage point reduction in the probability that an investment project
is rated as successful (column 3). This effect is larger (5.5 percentage
points) for infrastructure projects, while no longer signiﬁcant for pro-
jects evaluated after 1995.
Our results indicate that project outcomes do not depend exclusively
on the scaling-up of public investment but also on institutional capacity
(Denizer et al. 2013). There is a positive association between strong pol-
icies and institutions and project outcomes. A one standard deviation in-
crease in the institutional and policy indicator, which corresponds to
around a 0.68 change in the CPIA ratings (somewhat larger than the
change implied in the move from the CPIA threshold for weak policies
to the threshold for strong policies in the IMF-World Bank debt sustain-
ability analysis) is associated with an increase in the likelihood of pro-
ject success of 1.8 percentage points.
We also ﬁnd that projects aremore likely to be successful when they
are undertaken during periods in which the country is experiencing
higher growth rates (Denizer et al. 2013; Kilby 2015). Contrary to
the presumption that better human capital endowment would im-
prove project outcomes, the coefﬁcient on the human capital index
Table 2
Baseline results.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole sample Infra proj post-1995
Country-level variables
SCALE UP −0.013⁎⁎ −0.013⁎ −0.014⁎
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
GROWTH 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎ 0.009⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CPIA 0.027⁎ 0.011 0.031⁎
(0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
GDP −0.002 −0.005 0.044⁎⁎⁎
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
HC 0.018 0.002 −0.003
(0.027) (0.034) (0.029)
AID −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.008⁎⁎⁎ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FRAGMENTATION −0.033 −0.109 −0.069
(0.094) (0.120) (0.109)
Project-level variables
SIZE 0.018⁎⁎ −0.013 0.000 −0.017 −0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
SHARE WB FINANCING 0.007 0.004 0.023 0.047 0.045
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.039)
SHARE 1st SECTOR −0.001 −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ 0.000 −0.001⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ERR (0/1) 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.060⁎⁎
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027)
REPEATER 0.029 0.026 0.028 0.031 0.048⁎
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 3945 3945 3945 2447 2737
R2 0.183 0.252 0.197 0.183 0.205
Country FE No Yes No No No
Lending instrument FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model inwhich the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satisfactory/
unsatisfactory. Infra: infrastructure. LICs: low-income countries. The associated standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-year level, are reported in brackets. A constant is
included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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hood that projects are assessed as satisfactory across country in-
come level.
Our main results regarding the role of country-level variables in the
success of individual projects point to the relevance of absorptive capac-
ity constraints and are generally quite stable across different samples of
projects. Therefore, we focus on the full sample of investment projects
to preserve the largest sample size.19
4.1.2. Project-level variables
Looking at the correlation between project-level variables and out-
comes, we ﬁnd, consistent with Denizer et al. (2013), a mixed evidence
on the correlation between our proxies for project complexity and out-
comes: smaller projects are generally more likely to be successful than
larger (i.e. more complex) ones (column1), but these results are no lon-
ger signiﬁcant once we control for country ﬁxed effects (column 2) or
add country-speciﬁc variables.20 However, projects which are more
concentrated in one sector – and therefore should be less complex to19 Results for alternative sub-samples – and in particular for the infrastructure projects
that are the onesmore closely related to our research question about the likely growth ef-
fect of the ramping up of infrastructure spending in low-income developing countries –
are available upon request.
20 Interestingly, the coefﬁcient on project size is positive and signiﬁcant in column 1
when we do not control for country-level variables/ﬁxed effects, suggesting that in this
case, the size of the project would capture some country characteristic(s).manage – are less likely to have a positive outcome than diversiﬁed
ones. The dummies identifying projects that have been repeated and
that have an expected rate of return are not robustly correlated with
project outcomes, apart from the sub-sample of projects evaluated
after 1995.
4.2. Additional ﬁnancing and absorptive capacity
In light of the recent reliance on external borrowing to ﬁnancing in-
frastructure spending in LIDCs, an interesting question is whether our
results hold for the subset of investment accelerations that have been
driven by a shift in aggregate savings, possibly due to an increase in cap-
ital inﬂows and/or grants. The evidence discussed so far shows that
there is a negative association between individual project outcomes
and public investment scaling-up, but it does not differentiate between
episodes in which the increase in investment is due to a shift in aggre-
gate savings and the ones driven by a shift in the public investment
schedule. The former episodes are consistent with the hypothesis that
additional ﬁnancing could make absorptive capacity constraints bind-
ing, as governments will get closer to the ‘skill limit’ andwill start to se-
lect poor projects as long as the overall project ﬁnancing increases.
Thus, we isolate these episodes of investment scaling-up moving
from the consideration that, in a simple savings-investment scheme, a
greater supply of public savings (either due to aid, capital inﬂows, or do-
mestic revenue mobilization) would result in lower real interest rates
and higher investment. Thus, we look at the correlation between public
Table 3
Additional test: absorptive capacity constrained (ACC) projects.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2)
ACCP Non-ACCP
Country-level variables
SCALE UP −0.015⁎ −0.001
(0.008) (0.011)
GROWTH 0.003 0.009⁎⁎
(0.003) (0.004)
CPIA 0.020 0.010
(0.025) (0.026)
GDP −0.005 −0.002
(0.021) (0.023)
HC 0.007 0.078
(0.041) (0.050)
AID −0.006⁎⁎ −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
FRAGMENTATION −0.074 −0.202
(0.159) (0.159)
Project-level variables
SIZE 0.018 −0.016
(0.015) (0.017)
SHARE WB FINANCING 0.006 −0.003
(0.065)⁎⁎⁎ (0.076)
SHARE 1st SECTOR 0.000 −0.002⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001)
ERR (0/1) 0.021 0.043
(0.038) (0.044)
REPEATER 0.022 0.078⁎
(0.035) (0.040)
Observations 1697 1409
R2 0.306 0.405
Country FE No No
Lending instrument FE Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model in which
the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satis-
factory/unsatisfactory. ACCP: absorptive capacity constrained projects. The associated
standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-year level, are reported in brackets.
A constant is included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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vestment projects. In particular, we build a measure of the change in
the real interest rate for each i-th project undertaken in country j over
the period ey-ay in the same way as calculated the SCALE UP variable
(see Eq. (2)). First, we consider, for each country-year pair, the differ-
ence between the real interest rate and its country-speciﬁc average in
the previous ﬁve-year period; second, we take the average of these dif-
ferences over the length of the project. Finally, we split our sample be-
tween projects that have been executed during years when the real
interest rate and aggregate public investmentwere positively correlated
and the ones undertaken in periods when more public investment
went hand-in-hand with lower real interest rates (absorptive capacity
constrained projects (ACCP).
Table 3 reports the results for these two sub-samples. The estimates
lend support to the hypothesis that the average effect we found in the
baseline regressions is driven by the presence of absorptive capacity
constraints in periods in which public investment accelerations have
been associated with increasing savings (column 1). The coefﬁcient on
the SCALE UP variable is signiﬁcant only for ACCP,while it ismuch small-
er (in absolute value) and not statistically signiﬁcant for the other non
absorptive capacity constrained projects. In particular, the point esti-
mate is, in absolute value, larger than the one obtained on the whole
sample (see Table 2, column 3), suggesting that the actual effect of ab-
sorptive capacity on project outcomes is larger that the average one es-
timated in the baseline regressions.21
4.3. Heterogeneity in the scaling-up of public investment
Our baseline results show that a rapid scaling-up of public invest-
ment seems to generate absorptive capacity bottlenecks, as it is asso-
ciated with worse project outcomes. In this section we investigate
whether this average result varies with some country-speciﬁc
characteristics.
First, we interact SCALE UPwith the ratio of the stock of public capital
to GDP in the year of project approval (G/Y) to testwhether the negative
correlation between scaling-up and project outcomes is stronger when
the stock of public capital-to-GDP ratio is larger, under the assumption
that an increase in investment is more likely to generate absorptive
capacity constraints when the initial public capital stock is high. By
contrast, a rapid acceleration of public investment in capital scarce
countries could be less likely to generate problems, as infrastructure
needs coupled with low capital stocks would imply the availability of
a large number of potentially proﬁtable investments. Results, shown
in Table 4, indicate that the negative correlation between public invest-
ment scaling-up and project outcomes increases (in absolute terms)
with the public capital stock-to-GDP ratio (column 2). The marginal ef-
fect of SCALE UP on the probability of a satisfactory project evaluation is
less than half (−0.0042) the average (−0.013, column 1) for countries
whose public capital stock-to-GDP ratio is 50% (a value slightly larger
than the ﬁrst quartile of the sample distribution, 45%), but it increases
(in absolute terms) to almost−0.021 for countries with a public capital
stock-to-GDP ratio of 200% (a value close to the 90% of the sample dis-
tribution); for those countries, a scaling-up of public investment-to-21 To further convince the reader of the validity of our ﬁndings, we exploit the fact that
the World Bank PPR data set provides information not only on investment loans but also
on development policy lending (DPL), including the structural adjustment loans extended
in the 1980s and 1990s. These loans capture general budget support and are extended to
promote countrywidemacroeconomic and structural reforms so that their outcome could
be less inﬂuenced by absorptive capacity constraints (however, the identiﬁcation is not
watertight, as a successful adjustment operation could also require signiﬁcant government
commitment and capacity). Thus, we run a sort of ‘placebo test’ replicating our baseline
model on the sample of DPL projects (Table A3). Notwithstanding the small sample size
(slightly more than 500 projects), we still ﬁnd that some of the macroeconomic variables
are signiﬁcantly associated with DPL project outcomes, so that we can be conﬁdent that
themodel iswell speciﬁed. However, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on the scaling-up of pub-
lic investment is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant (but standard errors remain
small), consistent with what to expect from a placebo regression.GDP ratio of three percentage points translates into a six percentage
point reduction in the likelihood that a process will be satisfactory.
Second, we allow for the possibility that the intensity of absorptive
capacity constraints could change with the quality of policies and insti-
tutions and with GDP per capita. On the one hand, public investment
scaling-up could be more likely to be successful in richer countries
and in ones with sound policies in place, as those countries would be
better equipped to manage a rapid increase in public investment. On
the other hand, if the CPIA index and GDP per capita are proxies for
the (unobservable) availability of high-return public investment oppor-
tunities, absorptive capacity would be less binding in countries that are
poorer and have worse policies and institutions. The estimated coefﬁ-
cient supports the second hypothesis, given that we ﬁnd that the nega-
tive effect of the scaling-up on project outcomes increases (in absolute
terms) with the level of the CPIA index (column 3) and GDP per capita
(column 4). In particular, the coefﬁcient on SCALE UP is−0.015 when
the CPIA index is 3.6 (the sample median), but it ranges from values
close to zero (−0.005) for countries withweak policies and institutions
(CPIA=3) to−0.02 values for countries with good policies and institu-
tions (CPIA=4). The effect of GDP per capita is similar but slightly
larger: the coefﬁcient on SCALE UP ranges from−0.006 for countries
with an annual GDP per capita of about 400 USD (the ﬁrst quartile of
the sample distribution), to−0.024 for countries with a GDP per capita
of almost 3000 USD (a value between the 75th and the 90th percentile
of the sample distribution). Controlling jointly for the CPIA index and
Table 4
Heterogeneities.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Country-level variables
SCALE UP −0.013⁎⁎ 0.001 0.043 0.048 0.121⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎ −0.049 −0.012⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.009) (0.027) (0.035) (0.042) (0.008) (0.041) (0.006)
SCALE UP×G/Y −0.011⁎ −0.013⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006)
GY −0.010 −0.018
(0.014) (0.016)
SCALE UP×CPIA −0.016⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.007)
SCALE UP×GDP −0.009⁎ −0.008⁎
(0.005) (0.005)
SCALE UP×AID 0.001
(0.001)
SCALE UP×FRAGMENTATION 0.045
(0.051)
SCALE UP2 0.000
(0.001)
GROWTH 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CPIA 0.027⁎ 0.027⁎ 0.018 0.029⁎ 0.018 0.027⁎ 0.029⁎ 0.027⁎
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP −0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.005 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
HC 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.023 0.017 0.018 0.017
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
AID −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FRAGMENTATION −0.033 −0.034 −0.046 −0.028 −0.046 −0.022 −0.005 −0.031
(0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.102) (0.094)
Project-level variables
SIZE 0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
SHARE WB FINANCING 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
SHARE 1st SECTOR −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ERR (0/1) 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
REPEATER 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.028
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 3945 3945 3945 3945 3945 3945 3945 3945
R2 0.197 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.200 0.197 0.197 0.197
Country FE No No No No No No No No
Lending instrument FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model inwhich the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satisfactory/
unsatisfactory. The associated standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-year level, are reported in brackets. A constant is included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
22 Additional tests have been carried out to explore the presence of a non-linearity, in-
cluding a spline speciﬁcation, consistent with Berg et al. (2013), but there is no statistical
support for the presence of a threshold effect.
26 A.F. Presbitero / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 17–31GDP per capita – as well as for the existing public capital stock – does
not alter the main results, as all the three interaction terms remain sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and the point estimates are similar to the ones re-
ported in columns 2–4 (column 5). These results seem to suggest that
absorptive capacity constraints are less likely to be binding for poorer
countries, where there is a relative scarcity of public capital and policies
and institutions are weaker than in other countries.
Third, to better differentiate between the ‘pure’ absorptive capac-
ity hypothesis and the effect of aid bonanza and donor fragmentation
we interact the SCALE UPmeasure with the two aid-related variables
(columns 6–7). A negative and signiﬁcant interaction term would
imply that absorptive capacity constraints are exacerbated for pro-
jects undertaken during periods of large aid ﬂows or in countries
that have to deal with a multitude of donors. Our results, by contrast,
do not ﬁnd any evidence for these effects, lending further support to
the fact that our ﬁndings are solely related to investment scaling-up
and not to foreign aid.Finally, given that absorptive capacity constraints are oftenmodeled
assuming that internal adjustment costs are quadratic in the investment
level (van der Ploeg 2012), or considering a non-linear change in efﬁ-
ciency as investment exceeds a given threshold (Berg et al. 2013), in
the last columnwe allow for a convex effect of the scaling-up. The inclu-
sion of a squared term does not suggest the presence of any non-
linearity. Because ﬁtting a quadratic relationship is a simple way to
test for non-linearity, in the robustness section we also experiment
with measures of investment booms to capture some of the features
of existing models.22
Table 5
Adding country ﬁxed effects.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All proj Infra proj post-1995 ACCP Non-ACCP
Country-level variables
SCALE UP −0.012⁎ −0.010 −0.007 −0.019⁎ 0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
GROWTH 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
CPIA −0.013 −0.047⁎⁎ −0.008 −0.026 −0.016
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.033)
GDP −0.118⁎⁎ −0.211⁎⁎⁎ 0.013 −0.219⁎ −0.089
(0.054) (0.064) (0.073) (0.114) (0.091)
HC 0.399⁎⁎⁎ 0.566⁎⁎⁎ −0.437⁎⁎ 0.003 0.219
(0.145) (0.185) (0.220) (0.292) (0.326)
AID −0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.010 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
FRAGMENTATION 0.074 −0.185 0.096 0.688⁎⁎ −0.796⁎⁎
(0.164) (0.237) (0.227) (0.328) (0.326)
Project-level variables
SIZE −0.011 −0.022⁎ −0.014 0.017 −0.028
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021)
SHARE WB FINANCING 0.011 0.060 0.028 −0.036 0.012
(0.039) (0.053) (0.040) (0.065) (0.082)
SHARE 1st SECTOR −0.001⁎⁎ 0.000 −0.001⁎⁎ 0.000 −0.002⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ERR (0/1) 0.004 0.006 0.049⁎ 0.002 0.057
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040) (0.044)
REPEATER 0.027 0.034 0.041 0.031 0.072⁎
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.039)
Observations 3945 2446 2736 1693 1407
R2 0.256 0.252 0.266 0.402 0.487
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lending instrument FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model inwhich the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satisfactory/
unsatisfactory. Infra: infrastructure; DPL: development policy lending; ACCP: absorptive capacity constrained projects. The associated standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-
year level, are reported in brackets. A constant is included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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We test the robustness of our ﬁndings along several dimensions.We
start augmenting the model ﬁrst with country ﬁxed effects and with a
set of additional project- and country-level variables. Then, we intro-
duce several alternative deﬁnitions of public investment scaling-up. In
the Appendix we also report the estimates obtained with a probit
model (Tables A4–A6), which conﬁrm the main results.5.1. Country ﬁxed effects and additional controls
Table 5 replicates the baseline speciﬁcation across the four different
samples and the sample split between ACCP and other projects adding
country ﬁxed effects. In this way we exploit only the within-country
variation in project outcomes, washing out all country-speciﬁc time in-
variant heterogeneity. Speciﬁcally, one could argue that differences in
public investment efﬁciency may affect project outcomes, as suggested
by some empirical evidence on the output effect of public investment
(Abiad et al. 2015). If thiswere the case – and assuming that investment
efﬁciency is time invariant23 – country ﬁxed effects should capture the
role of efﬁciency and possibly wash out the signiﬁcant effect of absorp-
tive capacity. As expected, some of the country-speciﬁc variables are no23 Pritchett et al. (2013) argue that many developing countries havemade little progress
in state implementation capacity, and that “short-term programmatic efforts to build ad-
ministrative capability in these countries are thus unlikely to be able to demonstrate actual
success.” In practice, essentially all availablemeasures of efﬁciency are time-invariant, see
Berg et al. (2015) for a discussion.longer signiﬁcant once the model is augmented with country ﬁxed
effects. By contrast, the coefﬁcient on the SCALE UP variable in the
whole sample of investment projects is similar in size to the one esti-
mated without country ﬁxed-effects, although it is imprecisely estimat-
ed when exclusively considering infrastructure projects and those
evaluated after 1995. Moreover, the sample split between ACCP and
other projects (columns 4–5) conﬁrms the main results and lends
support to the presence of absorptive capacity constraints during the
scaling up of public investment. At the same time, these results suggest
that absorptive capacity is not related with the level of investment efﬁ-
ciency, but it could affect changes in efﬁciency, as discussed in the
introduction.
Having been assured that our ﬁndings are not driven by time-
invariant country speciﬁc heterogeneity we control for the possible
effect of other project-speciﬁc variables, which have been excluded
from the baseline speciﬁcation as they are likely to be endogenous.
We consider two project evaluation characteristics: 1) the number of
years that have passed between completion and evaluation (TIME EVAL-
UATION), and 2) the speciﬁc kind of evaluation review (TYPE EVALUA-
TION), so that we can distinguish among projects that have received
the standard Implementation Completion Report (ICR) by the World
Bank, the ones which received the desk review by the IEG (this evalua-
tion replaced the ICR since 1995), and the ones for which the IEG per-
formed a more detailed Project Performance Audit Report.2424 We are not able to estimate the correlation between the length of the project (mea-
sured by the number of years between the approval and the ﬁnal ﬁscal year of the project)
and project outcomes because of collinearity.
Table 6
Adding project- and country-level controls.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country-level variables
SCALE UP −0.013⁎⁎ −0.014⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
GROWTH 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.005⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CPIA 0.030⁎ 0.027⁎ 0.027⁎ 0.027⁎ 0.032⁎⁎ 0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.023⁎ 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
HC 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.018 0.010 0.001
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
AID −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.003⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FRAGMENTATION −0.022 −0.034 −0.025 −0.110
(0.095) (0.094) (0.097) (0.095)
G/Y −0.006
(0.015)
AIDay −0.003⁎⁎
(0.001)
AID FRAGMENTATIONay −0.046
(0.083)
SHARE TOP3 DONORS 0.000
(0.001)
WB LENDING −0.540⁎⁎⁎
(0.102)
RESOURCE RENT −0.005⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
Project-level variables
SIZE −0.001 0.000 0.003 −0.000 −0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
SHARE WB FINANCING 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.028
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
SHARE 1st SECTOR −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ERR (0/1) 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.006 −0.001 0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
REPEATER 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
TIME EVALUATION −0.016⁎⁎
(0.008)
Observations 3904 3945 3923 3945 3851 3923
R2 0.197 0.197 0.199 0.197 0.207 0.203
Country FE No No No No No No
Lending instrument FE Yes No No No No No
Type evaluation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model inwhich the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satisfactory/
unsatisfactory. The associated standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-year level, are reported in brackets. A constant is included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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type of evaluation including two dummies and they indicate that the
time lag between the end of the project and its evaluation is negatively
associated with project outcomes. This result is consistent with a re-
verse causality interpretation, given that implementation problems
are likely to cause delays in closing and evaluation.
The other four columns of Table 6 show some additional robustness
tests on country-speciﬁc variables. We start by including the stock of
public capital as a share of GDP. If there is a positive association between
investment spending and capital accumulation, our results could capture
a sort of level effect. However,wedonotﬁnd that investment projects are
less likely to be successful in countries with a large endowment of public
capital, while the effect of the scaling-up is conﬁrmed (column 2).
In column 3 we measure the aid-to-GNI ratio and the donor frag-
mentation variables in the starting year of the project, rather than aver-
aging over the length of the project, to mitigate possible endogeneity
concerns. We ﬁnd again that larger aid ﬂows are associated with alower probability of success, while donor fragmentation is not signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with project outcomes. To further test this claim, in
column 4 we employ an alternative measure of donor fragmentation,
considering the share of total ODA provided to the recipient country
by the three largest donors. Consistent with our previous results, this
alternative variable does not point to any correlation between donor
fragmentation and project outcomes.
Then, we replace the aid-to-GNI ratio with the ratio of Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) credits and
International Development Association (IDA) loans to GDP (WB
LENDING) as a measure of the value of overall resources that the
World Bank allocates the country during the length of the project.
Given that we aim to explain the variability of World Bank project
outcomes, one could argue that this indicator is more suitable for our
purposes than amore general indicator of ODA (which does not include
IBRD lending).While thismeasure has been taken as a possible proxy to
signal the presence of limited absorptive capacity, a negative correlation
29A.F. Presbitero / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 17–31betweenWB LENDING and project outcomes, as indicated by the esti-
mates reported in column 5, could also indicate limited management
capacity of theWorld Bank (Guillaumont and Laajaj 2006). Irrespective
of the interpretation of this result, it is important to note that the coef-
ﬁcient on the SCALE UP variable remains stable.
Finally, in the last column we control for dependence on natural re-
sources by adding the value of total natural resource rents as a share of
GDP, averaged over the length of the project (data from the World De-
velopment Indicators) to the set of explanatory variables. Natural re-
source rents are negatively associated with project success, and this
effect washes out the one of the CPIA index, suggesting that dependence
on natural resources could proxy for poor policies (in fact, the correla-
tion between RESOURCE RENT and CPIA is−0.25).
5.2. Alternative deﬁnitions of the scaling-up of public investment
We recognize that the deﬁnition of public investment scaling-up
used so far is arbitrary. Therefore, we test the robustness of ourmain re-
sult using a number of possible alternative deﬁnitions of investment
scaling-up.
First, we assess the robustness of our ﬁndings to alternative deﬁni-
tions of the historical public investment-to-GDP ratio used to measure
the intensity of the scaling-up. Hence, we calculate the SCALE UP vari-
able considering the difference between the actual public investment-
to-GDP ratio and its average over the previous three or ten-year period
and taking the average of these differences over the length of the pro-
ject. Then, for each of the three proposed deviations of the publicTable 7
Robustness: alternative deﬁnitions of public investment scaling-up.
Dep. var.: OUTCOME (1) (2) (3)
Country-level variables
SCALE UP3 −0.015⁎⁎
(0.007)
SCALE UP10 −0.007⁎⁎
(0.004)
SCALE UPay
3 −0.009⁎⁎
(0.003)
SCALE UPay
5
SCALE UPay
10
ΔG/Y
BOOM
BOOMay
GROWTH 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CPIA 0.028⁎ 0.027⁎ 0.029⁎
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
GDP −0.002 −0.003 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
HC 0.019 0.018 −0.001
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
AID −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FRAGMENTATION −0.039 −0.043 −0.136
(0.094) (0.094) (0.095)
Observations 3939 3939 3584
R2 0.196 0.196 0.216
Country FE No No No
Lending instrument FE Yes Yes Yes
Approval year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Evaluation year × sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the regression coefﬁcients of a linear probability model inwhich the de
unsatisfactory. The associated standard errors, clustered at the country evaluation-year level, a
stant are included.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.investment-to-GDP ratio from its historical average in the three, ﬁve
and ten-year before project approval, we consider the value in the
year of the project approval rather than averaging over the length of
the project. In this way, we condition the scaling-up to the information
available before the start of the project. Third, we measure scaling-up
considering public capital accumulation rather than looking at public in-
vestment data. Speciﬁcally, we consider the difference between the
stock of public capital at the end of the project and in the ﬁrst year of
the project (ΔG/Y).
Finally, to further explore the possibility of a nonlinear effect of scal-
ing up, we also experimented by deﬁning episodes of public investment
booms as events when the public investment-to-GDP ratio is above a
threshold (10%) and the deviation from its historical trend is above
one standard deviation of the detrended investment-to-GDP series.
We build two dichotomous indicators of investment booms: theﬁrst in-
dicator is equal to one if there is at least one investment boom during
the length of the project (BOOM, 36% of theprojects are undertaken dur-
ing a boomdeﬁned thisway), while the second,more restrictive, indica-
tor is equal to one if the year of project approval is also a starting year of
an investment boom (BOOMay, 6% of the projects are undertaken during
a boom deﬁned in this way).
Results are presented in Table 7, wherewe report the coefﬁcients on
the alternative scaling-up variables and on other country-speciﬁc con-
trols. The estimates consistently support the hypothesis that a sustained
scaling-up of investment, compared to its historical average, is negative-
ly correlatedwith the likelihood of a project being satisfactory. A similar
effect is obtained when considering public capital accumulation over(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
−0.007⁎⁎
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.098⁎⁎
(0.042)
−0.002
(0.019)
0.020
(0.033)
0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.029⁎ 0.029⁎ 0.035⁎⁎ 0.030⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.008 0.007 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
−0.002 −0.001 0.018 0.021 0.022
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
−0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
−0.139 −0.150 −0.052 −0.068 −0.065
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.093) (0.092)
3584 3584 3354 3939 3939
0.216 0.215 0.203 0.195 0.195
No No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pendent variable is a binary variable measuring the outcome of the project as satisfactory/
re reported in brackets. The group of project-level variables included in Table 2 and a con-
30 A.F. Presbitero / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 17–31the length of the project (ΔG/Y, column 6). By contrast, the coefﬁcients
on investment booms are not signiﬁcant (columns 7–8). Read together,
these additional ﬁndings would suggest that what matters more for ab-
sorptive capacity is the acceleration of investmentwith respect to previ-
ous years, rather than being above a speciﬁc common threshold, in line
with the lack of any signiﬁcant results when ﬁtting a quadratic relation-
ship (Table 4, column 8). In other words, thresholds abovewhich public
investment could generate absorptive capacity constraints are likely to
be country speciﬁc.
The coefﬁcients on other macroeconomic variables are mainly un-
changed, and GDP growth and CPIA are positively correlated with the
likelihood of success, while large aid ﬂows are associated with a lower
probability of project success.
6. Conclusions
Recent developments in modeling the output effects of scaling-up
public investment have pointed out the critical role of investment
efﬁciency and absorptive capacity constraints (Berg et al. 2013;
Richmond et al. 2015; van der Ploeg 2012; van der Ploeg and Venables
2013). This paper deals exclusively with the latter issue (see instead
Berg et al. (2015) for a discussion about efﬁciency in developing coun-
tries) and provides new empirical evidence on the actual importance
of absorptive capacity constraints in developing countries. Our results
indicate that investment and infrastructure projects are less likely to
be successful when they are undertaken during periods of higher than
average public investment. We are also able to differentiate this effect
from the effects due to foreign aid bonanzas and donor fragmentation.
On the one hand, these ﬁndings are consistent with the presence of
supply bottlenecks and poor project selection and with the importance
of sound policies and institutions for the selection and management of
public investment projects. On the other hand, we conﬁrm that a large
part of the variability across project outcomes is due to project-level ob-
servable and non-observable characteristics rather than to macroeco-
nomic effects, and the estimated magnitude of the effect of absorptive
capacity on project outcomes is relatively small, especially in poor and
capital scarce countries.With respect to the latter point, it isworthmen-
tioning that our results could be a lower bound of absorptive capacity
constraints. In fact, it is possible to argue that World Bank ﬁnancing
may pressure governments to prioritize the management of the
selected projects, reducing the apparent impact of absorptive capacity
constraints. In addition, given that money is fungible, if World Bank ﬁ-
nancing expands the government's budget constraint but the World
Bank itself selects projects with high rates of return, the marginal pro-
jects ﬁnanced by the government could be more affected by absorptive
capacity constraints than the ones ﬁnanced by theWorld Bank. Howev-
er, one can also argue that our results overestimate absorptive capacity:
if project selection by the World Bank lacks “borrower ownership,” the
governmentmight be less engaged inWorld Bank projects than in other
public investment projects, leading to a lower success rate (Johnson and
Wasty 1993).
Because our results are based on a sample of investment projects ﬁ-
nanced by one donor one may question their validity in a broader con-
text. There are at least two arguments to support the view that results
could have implication beyond World Bank ﬁnanced projects. First,
theWorld Bank is one of the largest donors, and its model for selecting,
ﬁnancing and assessing projects is the most common one across aid
agencies (Denizer et al. 2013). Second, Bulman et al. (2015) show that
the relationship between project- and country-speciﬁc variables and
the outcome of projects ﬁnanced by the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank are similar, suggesting that the main ﬁndings are
not due to idiosyncratic factors of the two institutions, but are general-
izable to aid projects.
With these caveats inmind, we believe that these results can provide
some useful insights for policies in a period of public investment
ramping up in LIDCs. While our ﬁndings do not imply that publicspending in infrastructure needs to be curtailed, they speak to the im-
portance of carefully assessing the design of public investment plans
(i.e. how much spending is front loaded). This is an extremely relevant
issue for many LIDCs experiencingwindfall revenues due to commodity
prices and, at the same time, have pressing needs to scale up infrastruc-
ture spending. In the presence of absorptive capacity constraints,
scaling-up investment too much and too fast can reduce the success
rate of individual projects, limiting the aggregate output effect of public
investment; in this case, a gradual scaling-up is preferable.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.12.005.References
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